Family Law Hub

Trusts

Latest updates

  • A judgment that, Knowles J said, endeavoured to provide a clear context for the claims brought by the former wife against some of the eleven respondents, and to then analyse and determine those claims, having taken account of a mass of documentary and oral evidence. The wife had been the victim of a series of schemes designed to put every penny of the husband’s wealth beyond her reach, a strategy designed to render her powerless by ensuring that, if she did not settle her claim for financial relief following their divorce on the husband’s terms, there would be no assets left for her to enforce against. Knowles J's decision was as follows. To grant relief to the wife against Counselor Trust: (a) as trustee of the Genus Trust, in the sum received from Cotor, the best estimate of which was US$650 million; (b) as trustee of the Arbaj Trust, US$36,624,946, CHF 4,000,000 and £1 million ; (c) as trustee of the Ladybird Trust, US$46,752,468, CHF 1,287,078.50, €76,918 and £128,100; and (d) as trustee of the Carnation Trust, US$455,363,485, and CHF 10,000; with joint and several liability where relevant to avoid double recovery. She granted relief to the wife against Sobaldo Establishment, in its capacity as trustee of the Longlaster Trust, in the sum of US$546,735,165. The relief granted against the eldest son, Temur, was (a) US$67,500,000 in respect of the claim for transfers of the Monetary Assets to him from Cotor in 2015 and 2016; (b) US$31,499,998 in respect of the claim for receipt of Monetary Assets previously held by Counselor Trust and/or Sobaldo Establishment between 2017 and 2019; and (c) RUB 531,560,331 in respect of the claim in respect of a Moscow property. His oral evidence had been preceded by his belated admissions of having significantly breached his disclosure obligations, described by Knowles J as "lamentable litigation conduct". She also granted the wife relief against Borderedge Ltd in the sum of €27,500,021.38. Judgment, 02/05/2021, free
  • The wife made an application to implement the terms of a consent order. The husband cross-applied, to have the order implemented in a different manner. The premise of the consent order had been that two valuable properties in London and New York constituted matrimonial property, and their value would be aggregated with a third property, the overall value being divided equally between the parties. In Mostyn J's judgment, the true facts on which he had made the consent order had not been known by either the parties or the court at the time the order was made, and had the true facts been known (regarding the trusts involved, which were not capable of being collapsed or dissolved) he would have made a materially different order. The order was set aside. Judgment, 09/09/2020, free
  • An application by the former wife for a financial remedy order in respect of the parties’ only child, a six-year-old girl. The issue was to what extent the court should exercise its jurisdiction under section 23 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 to impose conditions on the release to the parties of a frozen fund of some £3.74 million, the fund having derived from the settlement of a medical negligence claim launched on behalf of their daughter. In Roberts J's view, there had to be a formal mechanism for ensuring that the child continued to benefit from those funds. She rejected the idea of a section 89 disability trust. She made an order for child maintenance of £2,000 per month. A sum of £150,000 from the father's share of the settlement monies would be set aside as a secured maintenance fund, with the father being entitled to draw down against that fund for the child maintenance payments. £900,000 of the settlement monies could be used by the father towards purchasing a property of his own, with a charge on the property in the child's name for that amount. The mother would be permitted to use settlement monies to redeem her existing mortgage. As a condition of the release of these funds, each parent would be required to purchase life insurance with the daughter as beneficiary. Judgment, 08/08/2020, free
  • The issue was whether or not Cohen J should determine, almost certainly by its dismissal, the wife's application for capital orders against the husband or whether he should further adjourn her capital claims. The husband had settled a trust with a very large sum of money, from which he had been irrevocably excluded after the marriage had broken down, and was in arrears with his periodical payments, but was living comfortably. Cohen J found that dismissing the wife's capital claims would be a matter of last resort, and adjourned them, with the proviso that they would be dismissed unless an application to restore them was made by 31 July 2022. Judgment, 07/08/2019, free
  • The couple married in 2016 after a long relationship, and the husband died later that year. The appeal was concerned with whether an application under s 2 of the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 could be made out of time, whether a beneficial interest under a discretionary trust instead of outright provision amounted to reasonable financial provision, and the relevance of a "stand-still agreement" in place while an out of court settlement was pursued. Asplin LJ found that the explanation for the lapse of time in this case was clear, and it had been wrong of the judge to find that the wife had received sufficient advice about the time limit and the 1975 Act. King LJ and Baker LJ agreed. The court exercised the power in s 4 of the 1975 Act to allow the wife to bring a claim out of time. Judgment, 31/07/2019, free

Latest know-how

Latest training

Copyright 

Copyright in the original legal material published on the Family Law Hub is vested in Mills & Reeve LLP (as per date of publication shown on screen) unless indicated otherwise.

Disclaimer

The Family Law Hub website relates to the legal position in England Wales and all of the material within it has been prepared with the aim of providing key information only and does not constitute legal advice in relation to any particular situation. While Mills & Reeve LLP aims to ensure that the information is correct at the date on which it is added to the website, the legal position can change frequently, and content will not always be updated following any relevant changes. You therefore acknowledge and agree that Mills & Reeve LLP and its members and employees accept no liability whatsoever in contract, tort or otherwise for any loss or damage caused by or arising directly or indirectly in connection with any use or reliance on the contents of our website except to the extent that such liability cannot be excluded by law.

Bookmark this item