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- The child arrangements order being appealed by the mother had been made by consent at the FHDRA, and had provided for the three children to live with her and spend time with the father. No reasons were given by the magistrates, and there were no references in the order to allegations of domestic abuse, safeguarding checks or to Practice Direction 12J – Child Arrangements and Contact Orders: Domestic Abuse and Harm, Family Procedure Rules 2010. The mother's grounds of appeal also asserted that a report supporting the terms of the order had been made without observing the father with the children and without the author having given proper consideration to the allegations of domestic violence. HHJ Cove found that the magistrates' decision was plainly wrong. No reasons had been given, the court had not had regard to PD 12J, the safeguarding checks were incomplete, and there had been no analysis of whether the consent order should be made nor of the risk of harm to the children. The order was set aside. Judgment, 18/12/2020, free
- A consent order drafted by the wife's counsel had stated that periodical payments from the husband to the wife would cease upon the husband's remarriage, due to a drafting error. Upon notice of his remarriage and his intention to cease the payments, the wife successfully applied without notice to have the order amended under the slip rule. The husband applied out of time for permission to appeal and to set the previous orders aside. Knowles J found that the court had had jurisdiction to amend the order, despite the husband's assertion that it was no longer extant. The error in the consent order had been wholly accidental and genuine, though it was unfortunate it had not been detected and corrected earlier. The case law was plain that the slip rule could be used to correct an order to give effect to the court's intention, and that was the case here. If not corrected, the error would deprive the wife of her entitlement to ongoing periodical payments and thus fail to give effect to the court's intention. The husband's appeal was dismissed. Judgment, 18/11/2020, free
- The wife made an application to implement the terms of a consent order. The husband cross-applied, to have the order implemented in a different manner. The premise of the consent order had been that two valuable properties in London and New York constituted matrimonial property, and their value would be aggregated with a third property, the overall value being divided equally between the parties. In Mostyn J's judgment, the true facts on which he had made the consent order had not been known by either the parties or the court at the time the order was made, and had the true facts been known (regarding the trusts involved, which were not capable of being collapsed or dissolved) he would have made a materially different order. The order was set aside. Judgment, 09/09/2020, free
- The former wife's defence to claims for possession of the matrimonial home, and for weekly use and occupation payments of £5000, had referred to the terms of the financial remedy consent order, which in her view permitted her to occupy the property until it was sold. The county court judge had rejected her interpretation of the order. Fancourt J allowed her appeal, deciding that the correspondence on which the former husband had relied in the county court was not admissible as evidence of the meaning of the consent order. The county court judge erred in interpreting the order and the reasons he gave for reaching the conclusion that the appellant was a gratuitous licensee were mistaken. Judgment, 11/12/2019, free
- The former husband applied to set aside part of a consent order relating to maintenance payments. The former wife cross-appealed for enforcement of maintenance arrears. The husband claimed that the consent order had been fraudulently changed without his knowledge, and that his wife had sent emails in his name to the firm involved in drafting the consent order. In emails to her the husband had expressed his belief that the maintenance changes were a mere "paperwork exercise" to enable her to get a new mortgage. Moor J found that the expert handwriting evidence as to the signature on the consent order was of no assistance, but he was satisfied that the wife had perpetrated a fraud on the husband, and that she had sent fraudulent emails on his behalf. The relevant paragraph of the order was set aside, and replaced with a clean break order. The wife owed the husband £248,930 from the sale of the matrimonial home, to be paid within 28 days. Judgment, 11/12/2019, free
- Husband's appeal against a judgment, in which the wife was released from various undertakings contained in a consent order, was allowed. Judgment, 20/08/2018, free
- Appeal against a ruling that the wife should be discharged from her undertaking. The appeal was allowed but the judge said that in fairness to the husband, replacement undertakings should be put in place. Judgment, 01/03/2018, free
- The terms of a foreign consent order having been implemented, the wife made an application under Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 seeking substantial additional provision for herself several years later (there having been no change in her circumstances). The judge ordered the appellant husband to pay to the wife a lump sum of £1,148,480 together with provision for the children of the marriage. The husband appealed against this order, it being unusual for an order to be made under Part III where a foreign order is in place. The court ruled that it was not appropriate to make an order under Part III in this case. Judgment, 05/10/2017, free
- Husband's application to set aside a previous consent order (made in 2010), his argument being that that the move of the two children from the wife to the husband in 2012 represented a change of circumstances sufficient to justify an application under FPR 2010 Rule 4.1(6) for the revocation of a paragraph of the order so that all five properties in the portfolio should, instead of continuing to be the wife’s property, be transferred back to the husband. The application was dismissed. Judgment, 06/03/2017, free
- Wife's appeal against the dismissal of her application to set aside a consent order in financial remedy proceedings which was made in 2005. Appeal dismissed. Judgment, 06/03/2017, free